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Book Review
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGU-
LATION, by W. Noel Keyes, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minne-
sota (1986). Pp. 841.
ROBERT C. GUSMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of government contracts is similar to the myth of Sisy-
phus who, as eternal punishment, was ordered by Pluto to roll a huge
stone to the top of a high hill. But each time he reached the top, the
stone rolled back down. Sisyphus is helpful in appreciating the chal-
lenge Professor Keyes assumed when he wrote the handbook Gov-
ernment Contracts Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation. He
has, paradoxically, begun a descent down a slippery slope into a field
that "suffers from the endemic disease of ambiguity and
imprecision."'
Procurement regulations, like the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR), are some of the most important written means for directing
the government procurement process. At the government's operating
level, regulations provide the main reference source for guidance on
government procurement policy and procedures. Regulations di-
rectly affect contractors to the extent they are given the force and
effect of law. For example, the provisions circumscribing powers of
contracting officers and other government officials relating to such
matters as organizational conflicts of interest and small business and
labor surplus programs, necessarily limit what contractors can ac-
complish by negotiation.
The impact of regulations goes beyond the immediate contracting
parties. Subcontractors and vendors are affected through flowdown
* Assistant General Counsel, Lockheed Corporation, Calabasas, California; B.A.,
University College, New York University, 1953; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1956; mem-
ber, New York, District of Columbia, and California bars. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and not necessarily those of any organization.
1. Sturm v. United States, 421 F.2d 723, 724 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
clauses. Workers, minorities, and others are affected by wage, hour,
and work standards, as well as by nondiscrimination, safety, health,
insurance, and environmental requirements. Thus, the FAR and
other procurement regulations have widespread administrative, legal,
and economic ramifications involving many parties in interest.
Professor Keyes' work is important to us from another vantage
point. Today, the United States' weapons acquisition and space sys-
tem contracts are subject to intensive public and judicial scrutiny.
The public is concerned because of media reports discussing allega-
tions of contractor misconduct and the possible misuse of public
funds. This anxiety is fanned by Congressional oversight hearings
and debates concerning which items shall be acquired and by which
strategies major acquisition programs should be managed by the ex-
ecutive agencies.
Congressional oversight, in the opinion of some observers, has
politicized the acquisition process. Indeed, in one respect it has gone
beyond that stage. Congress has intensified its management to the
point that it may be said to be acting as the immediate overseer of
the contracting process, thus bypassing the heads of the executive
agencies who are the ostensible holders of management authority.
As a result, the control of government contractors has increased, and
the regulation of all phases of the government's business has become
both intrusive and pervasive. 2
There is the old admonition: "He who seeks to regulate everything
by law is more likely to arouse vices than reform them." Similarly,
the regulation of government contracts by Congress and the execu-
tive branch carry long-term risks. First, there is the simple matter of
expense of enforcement and compliance. Further, as the rate of reg-
ulation increases, the prospect of actual enforcement declines, lead-
ing to petty tyranny by those who are in a position to enforce law
selectively. The government's regulation of a contractor's costs, prof-
its, management, employees' conduct, and resolution of disputes fre-
quently raises the threshold question of whether we are dealing with
law at all, as opposed to the raw power of a monopsony. After all, in
government procurement there are competing sellers, but there is
only a single buyer, who is a sovereign.
As Professor Keyes observes, this system causes, among other
things, tension between Congress and the executive branch of gov-
ernment. Similarly, it produces between the United States and the
contractor an inefficient and adversarial relationship. Generally, in
major acquisition contracts with the United States, there is now an
2. See generally THE PACKARD COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S
BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, A QUEST FOR EXCELLENCE
(June 1986).
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attitude which emphasizes the adverse interests of buyer and seller.
It is a relationship which assumes an overriding propensity for each
party to try for maximum legal and economic advantage. 3
Still, a government contract serves an economic purpose that is
identical to a commercial contract-to move goods or services from
the seller to the buyer at reasonable cost and in a reasonable time.
As to major government contracts, it has been suggested that this
principle is paramount because the underlying public purpose is to
fulfill the nation's security and scientific interests.4
In the award of government contracts, however, this commercial
principle is circumscribed by the theory of public law which seeks
free and open competition based upon the government's explicit spec-
ification of the goods or services it intends to procure. In this way, at
least in concept, all bidders are treated equally and the government
will pay a fair price resulting from the competition. Nevertheless,
the law's prerequisite for the government's solicitation of competitive
bids (subject to certain exceptions), and its requirement for the
award to be made to the responsive and responsible bidder offering
the lowest reasonable price, is a mandate for a rigid contracting sys-
tem. This inflexibility is reinforced by the system of procurement
regulation described in Professor Keyes' book.5
II. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION
The modern history of procurement regulation, as Professor Keyes'
text instructs us, has its roots in the Armed Services Procurement
Act of 1947, as amended. 6 This statute was applied to purchases by
the army, navy, air force, coast guard, and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. The Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949, as amended, applied to the purchases of other
executive agencies. 7 Although favoring formal advertising, these
Acts permitted the award of contracts by negotiation upon a finding
by the head of the procuring agency. They also established certain
minimum requirements for the advertisement of bids and, with the
3. W.N. KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION
REGULATION XXIX-XXXVI & § 33 (1986).
4. Checchi, Federal Procurement and Commercial Procurement Under the
U. C.C.-A Comparison, 11 PUB. CONT. L.J. 358, 377 (1980); Pasley, Formation of Gov-
ernment Contracts-Application of Common Law Principles-A Reply, 40 CORNELL
L.Q. 518, 520-24 (1955).
5. W.N. KEYES, supra note 3, at XXXVII-VIII.
6. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2316 (1982).
7. 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-260 (1982).
exception of "cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost" contracts, permitted the
use of any type of contract that promoted the best interests of the
United States.
The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, as amended, and
the Federal Property and Administrative Act were procedural stat-
utes. They were not a grant of authority to make purchases, but
rather assumed that authority was otherwise vested in the procure-
ment official. On this basis, Congress, through these statutes, has
listed the applicable procedures.8
The Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) which took
its name from the basic procurement statute, and its civilian agency
counterpart, the Federal Procurement Regulation (FPR), were based
upon the general authority of the department heads to issue regula-
tions for the government of their departments. As to the Defense
Department, title 10, section 2202 of the United States Code9 re-
quires, in effect, that the Secretary of Defense prescribe regulations
governing procurement of supplies and other functions related to
supply by offices and agencies of the Defense Department.
This system permitted the executive agencies, especially the De-
fense Department, to regulate procurement without excessive intru-
sion by the Congress. This arrangement permitted innovation and
flexibility, but it led to an ever-expanding, and ultimately compre-
hensive, regulation. The ASPR, before it was superseded by the
FAR, contained seventeen sections and eight appendices. The sec-
tions embraced general policies; procurement by formal advertising;
procurement by negotiation; interdepartmental procurement; Buy-
American Act procedures; contract clauses; contract termination; pat-
ents and copyrights; bonds and insurance; state and local taxes; labor
contract clauses and overtime procedures; government property; in-
spection and acceptance; contract cost principles; contract forms; spe-
cial procedures dealing with the correction of mutual mistakes;
amendments without consideration; and the formalization of infor-
mal commitments.
Although the ASPR was issued in the Defense Secretary's name,
its contents were under the control of the ASPR committee and its
chairperson. Under the ASPR system, the notice and hearing re-
quirements of the Administrative Procedure Act were inapplicable,
although industry views were obtained prior to the issuance of a new
or revised regulation through coordination with industry trade as-
sociations.' 0 The FPR generally followed the Defense Department's
8. S. REP. No. 571, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1947).
9. 10 U.S.C. § 2202 (1982).
10. See, e.g., Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to
Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1970);
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leadership in the promulgation of procurement regulations.
The ASPR was an important economic and legal document. For
example, the Supreme Court has made it clear that validly-issued
procurement regulations have the full force and effect of federal law,
even to the extent of overriding inconsistent state legislation."1
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), by repealing
the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, as amended, and other
procurement statutes, made fundamental and far-reaching changes to
the government's acquisition system.12 The FAR, which implements
the CICA, is developed in accordance with the requirements of the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act of 197413 as amended by
Public Law 96-83.
The FAR is prepared, issued, and maintained, and the FAR system
is prescribed, jointly by the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator
of General Services, and the Administrator of the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration, under their several statutory authori-
ties. The FAR generally applies to all executive branch acquisitions
of supplies or services and is prepared and issued through the coordi-
nated action of two councils, the Defense Acquisition Regulatory
Council (DAR Council) and the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council
(CAA Council).
The chairperson of the CAA Council is the representative of the
Administrator of the General Services Administration. The other
members of this council include one representative from each of the
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human
Services, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, and
Transportation, and from the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Small Business Administration and the Veterans Administration.
The Director of the DAR Council is the representative of the Sec-
retary of Defense, and the operation of the DAR Council is by the
Secretary of Defense. Membership includes representatives of the
military departments, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration. Responsibility for
processing revisions to the FAR is apportioned between the two
Grossbaum, Procedural Fairness in Public Contracts: the Procurement Regulations, 57
VA. L. REV. 171 (1971).
11. United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 371 U.S. 285 (1963); Paul v.
United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963); Federal Crop Ins. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
12. The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369 (1984) (amend-
ing the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 41 U.S.C. § 253, and
U.S.C. tit. 10).
13. Federal Procurement Policy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-400 (1974).
councils so that each council has cognizance over specified parts or
subparts.
The FAR, although the successor to the ASPR and the FPR, con-
sists of eight subchapters and fifty-three parts. When published in
the Federal Register on September 19, 1983, it was approximately
two inches thick. Its coverage is broader than its predecessors-it
regulates improper business practices and conflicts of interest; ad-
ministration; publicizing contract actions; acquisition planning; re-
quired sources of supplies and services; contractor qualifications;
contract awards; socioeconomic programs; patents, data and copy-
rights; bonds and insurance; taxes; cost regulations; contract financ-
ing; bid protests, disputes and appeals; contract management; and
clauses and forms. 14
Absent from the FAR process is the notion of an informal negotia-
tion of proposed regulations by affected groups, which would end in
an agreement that becomes the basis for a rule.15 Indeed, the govern-
ment maintains complete discretion in deciding which matters shall
be the subject of proposed regulations and in the disposition of public
comments when they are obtained. What is at work here, in reality,
are contracts of adhesion-a contract system for carrying out the gov-
ernment's directions for contract performance, used as a device for
the manipulation of social policies. 16
It should be abundantly clear that while the FAR affects the public
in general, its everyday impact is on lawyers, accountants, and execu-
tives in industry and government. Simply, the FAR is the hub of the
government's procurement wheel. For many, the question is
whether the FAR is a protection and guide established for the mu-
tual use of the government and industry, or whether it is a hostile
maze, established to perpetuate bureaucratic power.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE KEYES HANDBOOK
Understanding the history, goals, and weaknesses of the FAR sys-
tem makes it easier to understand the significance of Professor
Keyes' efforts and the usefulness of his text to the government con-
tract community. Although the government contracting field has
produced several case books,17 a loose-leaf service,' 8 various texts,19
14. 48 Fed. Reg. 42,102-42,643 (1983).
15. Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation As An Alternative to Traditional
Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (1981).
16. Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry, 41
VA. L. REV. 27 (1955); Stover, The Government Contract System as a Problem in Pub-
lic Policy, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 701 (1964).
17. See, e.g., R. NASH & J. CIBINIC, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW (3rd ed. 1977).
18. Gov't Cont. Rep. (CCH).
19. See, e.g., J. McBRIDE & I. WACHTEL, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: CYCLOPEDIC
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and a reporter of current information,20 Professor Keyes' achieve-
ment is significant in that he has contributed a broad-based work
which focuses solely on the FAR. The author declares that he will be
analytical, that his purpose will be limited to practical and business
affairs, and that his principal audience will be those who work with
the FAR. He explains:
There is no definitive text in the field of government contracting, nor can
there be. This book is intended to assist those with the problems most often
met by the business world in its dealings with the government and vice versa,
as well as to fill, in part, the existing void of critical textual material. The em-
phasis is on the law of contracts and subcontracts with the federal govern-
ment; contracts with state or local bodies are not included, nor is the law of
grants.
The areas covered by the book are of equal interest to contract administra-
tors as well as to lawyers, and certainly the lawyer must be aware of some
administrative matters in order to counsel effectively. However, the aim of
this book is to limit discussion of administration to those occasions where it is
necessary to delineate the legal background. No endeavor is made to show
how to obtain a government contract solely as a business proposition.2 1
Government contracts practitioners are grateful to Professor Keyes
for accomplishing this task with great skill and erudition. His work
as a law professor, practicing attorney, and attorney for the govern-
ment is apparent in his commentaries and analyses of the FAR. Pro-
fessor Keyes has organized his text so that it comments upon, and
runs parallel to, each FAR provision under consideration. Professor
Keyes intends, of course, for the reader to hold both the regulation
and the text before him and move from the FAR to the text in his
attempt to find a solution to a problem. We hope the publisher will
consider that the book's utility could be improved by the simple de-
vice of using tabs for each chapter.
The challenge all practitioners in the field of government contracts
have is that the subject is dynamic. We are constantly aware that our
advice must be based upon the latest statute, regulation, or case.
When using a government contracts text, we know caution is re-
quired because the basic material may be noncurrent, or perhaps sub-
ject to revision by the government.
Professor Keyes is addressing this issue by preparing supplements
to the text. Nevertheless, lack of currentness is a potential deficiency
of which the reader must be aware in using this or any other text in
GUIDE TO LAW, ADMINISTRATION, PROCEDURE (1963); M. RISHE, GOVERNMENT CON-
TRACT COSTS (1984); P. TRUEGER, ACCOUNTING GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
(8th ed. 1985).
20. Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA).
21. W.N. KEYES, supra note 3, at VII.
the field. This potential is most apparent in the chapters "Improper
Business Practices and Personal Conflicts of Interest"; "Patents, Data
and Copyrights"; and "Protests, Disputes and Appeals." As to the
first, it should be updated to include an industry self-governance pro-
gram known as the "Defense Industry Initiative."22 As to the second,
continuing Congressional tinkering has resulted in new restrictions
on the government's rights to use data.23 Finally, as to the third, the
Navy Department's use of the Alternate Dispute Resolution proce-
dure appears to be a favorable development. 24 These areas are to be
covered in the Supplement to be published in early 1988.
Professor Keyes has left several subjects for future consideration;
or, making this observation more explicit, some areas have not been
covered as fully as a critic would like. The following is a brief analy-
sis of specific provisions which this author feels would be aided by
supplemental information or analysis.
In section 1.4, "The Force of Procurement Regulations-The Chris-
tian Doctrine," Professor Keyes should have discussed the difference
between regulations promulgated for the benefit of the government,
legislative rules, and those enacted for the benefit of the contractor.
The issue that arises is the extent to which a government contractor
or the government itself shall be bound by procurement regulations
which the government has chosen not to follow.
Section 1.25, "The Absence of Power to Contract-Illegal Con-
tracts," should have included a discussion of the legality of contracts
which are entered into in advance of, or in amounts in excess of,
available appropriations. A brief reference to the Anti-Deficiency
Act appears in section 32.31(d) but, unfortunately, it is not made in
the context of the contracting officer acting in excess of his authority
where there is a promise to spend or actual expenditure in advance
of or in excess of appropriations. 25
In section 3.5(a), "Other Improper Business Practices-Buy In,"
users would have welcomed Professor Keyes' analysis of the govern-
ment view which does not regard this practice as illegal and, in fact,
encourages it.26 Further, in section 25.65, "The Certificate of Cost or
Pricing Data," Professor Keyes should have been clearer. It is impor-
tant to know that the boards and the courts will now hold that defec-
22. 48 Fed. Cont. Rep. 597 (1987).
23. See generally Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
525 (1984), modified by 1987 Defense Department Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 99-
500 (1987); Defense Technical Corrections Act of 1987, 101 Stat. 273 (1987).
24. See Navy Launches ADR Plan For Contract Disputes, 5 ALTERNATIVES TO THE
HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 33 (March 1987) (publication of the Center for Public Re-
sources); 48 Fed. Cont. Rep. 736 (1987).
25. See Ad Hoc Committee on the Role of DoD Contracting Officers, The DoD
Contracting Officer, 1987 A.B.A. SEC. OF PUB. CONT. L. 62-65.
26. 1 Gov't Cont. Rep. (CCH) 353.
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tive pricing may exist even though the contractor has not submitted a
pricing certificate to the contracting officer.27
Section 24.2, "The Freedom of Information Act" (FOIA), contains
no discussion of the Trade Secrets Act 2s and the important United
States Supreme Court decision in Chrysler v. Brown,29 which wove
this statute into the FOIA's fabric.
The inclusion of section 25.7, "The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,"
in a text relating to the FAR seems questionable. Treatment of this
area could be justified, perhaps, where a government contractor con-
tracts with a foreign government, but this seems beyond the scope of
the text. 30
In section 28.24, "Proposed Indemnification of Contractors for
Product Liability," Professor Keyes misconstrues the Comptroller
General's holding relating to the "Insurance-Liability to Third Per-
sons" clause. He describes the clause under consideration as an
"abuse." The Comptroller General, however, merely held that reim-
bursement for uninsured third party claims was subject to the availa-
bility of appropriated funds at the time of loss. The issue concerns
the time when the funds, if any, are available for settlement. This
result does not justify the overstatement contained in the text.
In section 42.6, "Negotiating Advance Agreements for Independent
Research and Development/Bid and Proposal Costs," a discussion of
the possible prohibition against the government's imposition of cost-
sharing upon the contractor would have been helpful, despite its ear-
lier discussion in section 31.18, in the chapter on Contract Cost
Principles.31
The title for the Table of Statutes is inaccurate because it includes
the tables for the regulations cited in the text as well. Separate ta-
bles for statutes and regulations would be more helpful and less
misleading.
So, too, one may quarrel with Professor Keyes' observation that,
"where not specifically governed by statute or regulation federal law
is 'the general law of contracts'-that is, the law as generally applied,
27. M-R-S Mfg. Co. v. United States, 492 F.2d 835 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Numex Elects.,
Inc., 85-3 B.C.A. (CCH) T 18,396.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982).
29. 441 U.S. 281, 318-19 n.49 (1978); see also McCarthy & Kormmeier, Maintaining
the Confidentiality of Confidential Business Information Submitted to the Federal
Government, 36 Bus. LAW. 57, 64-67 (1980).
30. A similar comment could be made with regard to Section 15.71, "Negotiation
Skills."
31. See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. United States, 568 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
in the states of our union."3 2 He suggests that legislative action clari-
fying the proper standard for interpretation of government contracts
is needed because the courts generally do not seek to find or apply
the general law of contracts.33
This author, for one, would vote against any legislative attempts to
codify the federal law of contracts. The judge-made law in this area
is satisfactory. Congress, on the other hand, due to its politicization
of government contracts, would likely distort basic contract law prin-
ciples into draconian doctrines. The federal law of contracts is com-
prised of the best of the common law's principles and the Uniform
Commercial Code. The latter, with the authoritative body of law
construing it, and the importance of the standard contract clauses
make it abundantly clear, in this author's opinion, that we should
leave the federal law of contracts free from legislative assistance.
This author's comments and observations should in no way detract
from Professor Keyes' achievement. This is, to be sure, a practi-
tioner's handbook which will be a guide to problem solving. But the
work is more-it is an intelligent and learned discussion of govern-
ment contract law and public policy issues. It is a text which is a wel-
come addition to practitioners' libraries.
32. W.N. KEYES, supra note 3, XLIII.
33. Id.
